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Mastery of One’s Domain Is Not 
the Essence of Management
Matthew Sinnicks1
A COMMENT ON Gregory Beabout (2012) “Management as a Domain-Relative 
Practice that Requires and Develops Practical Wisdom,” Bus Ethics Q 22(2): 
405–432.
ABSTRACT
I attempt to cast doubt on Beabout’s attempt to build on MacIntyre’s 
ethical theory by accounting for management as a ‘domain-relative’ 
practice for three reasons: i) we can partially engage in practices, so if 
management can be accounted a practice there is no need to invoke 
domain-relativity; ii) management does not seem to be domain-relative in 
the same way  that other examples of domain-relative practices might be; 
and iii) practical wisdom, which Beabout sees as key to management as a 
domain-relative practice, is adequately covered by MacIntyre’s account of 
politics.
FOR ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, we begin to acquire the virtues by en-
gaging in what he calls ‘practices’, which he (MacIntyre 2007: 187) 
defines as:
any coherent and complex form of socially established co-operative 
human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are 
realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence 










Discuss this commentary at http://bejr.co/2014-0202x
1 University of Hertfordshire. Email: m.i.sinnicks@herts.ac.uk
Cite as: Bus Ethics J Rev 2(2): 8–14,
http://doi.org/10.12747/bejr2014.02.02
Edited by Chris MacDonald & Alexei Marcoux
ISSN: 2326-7526
with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human 
conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended.
Paradigmatic examples of such activities include chess, fine arts, and 
philosophy. MacIntyre suggests that management cannot be a practice 
because it lacks distinctive internal goods, a claim supported by 
Beadle (2002). However, management scholars who find MacIntyre’s 
basic ethical framework compelling have sought to challenge this 
exclusion, and to account for management in terms of practices (e.g., 
Moore 2002). One possible solution to this apparent stand-off can be 
found in Beabout’s (2012) account of management as a ‘domain-
relative’ practice. Beabout accepts that management per se does not 
possess distinctive internal goods, and so cannot be a practice in and 
of itself, but instead argues that we can retain the intuition that man-
agement can be ethically rich and rewarding, as practices are, without 
rejecting MacIntyre’s moral philosophy by arguing that management 
should be regarded as a ‘domain-relative’ practice.
Domain-relativity, in Beabout's (2012: 406) sense, implies that 
such a practice “has its own internal standards of excellence and is 
always related to another particular domain.” Domain-relative practi-
ces are (2012: 414):
activities that 1) possess internal standards of excellence identifiable to 
practitioners, and 2) are always related to another particular domain. In 
each such case, familiarity  with the particularities of the other related 
domain is an integral feature of the activity . . . I am proposing that 
“domain-relative practices” always interlock with other practices...one 
teaches a subject, writes or speaks on a topic, coaches a sport, and so forth. 
In what follows I will offer three objections to Beabout’s account:
i) we can partially engage in practices, so if management can be 
accounted a practice there will be no need to invoke domain-
relativity; 
ii) management does not seem to be domain-relative in the same 
way that other possible examples of domain-relative practices 
might be; and
iii) the virtues Beabout suggests his account can explain, in 
particular practical wisdom, fall under the remit of MacIntyre’s ac-
count of politics, rendering the notion of management as a domain-
relative practice redundant. 
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i) Engagement Can Be Partial
While those with no experience of a particular practice are unqualified 
to pass judgement on it, those at the periphery of a particular practice 
remain engaged in that practice even without actually performing the 
activity which the practice essentially consists in. If, as MacIntyre 
(2007: 191) suggests, the audience at a concert is engaged in music, 
and “lovers of . . . a well-thrown pass” are engaged in football, then it 
seems engagement is primarily about membership of the relevant 
community. Therefore, in certain cases of what Beabout calls a 
domain-relative practice, individuals are actually engaged in the prac-
tice that constitutes the particular domain in question. This means we 
have no need to invoke domain-relativity to explain management. The 
basketball coach is engaged in basketball, and the physics teacher is 
engaged in physics. Managers, however, are not so engaged for there 
is, ex hypothesi, no practice that management counts as an en-
gagement in. This is not to say that no managers are practitioners. The 
manager of a firm of architects might have a love of great archi-
tecture, and be motivated by the desire to institutionally sustain the 
practice of architecture. However, the admission that managers can 
also be practitioners does not give us any reason to make pronounce-
ments about management as a whole, nor does it give us reason to 
think that manager-practitioners are such in virtue of the distinctly 
managerial elements of their role, and so those who would deny man-
agement the status of practice have, as yet, so reason to abandon that 
claim.
ii) Absence of Domain-Relativity in Management
Although I would regard a coach as partially engaged in the sport 
being coached, even if we accept that there are domain-relative prac-
tices, it is not clear that management belongs in this category because 
it seems to lack domain-relativity. Documentary making, for instance, 
may well be a domain-relative practice. A good documentary about a 
particular subject will have different characteristics from a document-
ary about another subject, so the practice is in some way domain 
relative because every documentary will have to do justice to its 
subject (i.e., domain), and yet documentary making has specifiable 
goods that are independent of any particular domain such as the 
intrinsic satisfaction of capturing the key features of a subject visu-
ally, and of selecting and editing material that adds up to a distinctly 
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documentary-apt satisfying whole. Documentary makers will thus 
carefully research the domain in question, and will have no hope of 
achieving the goods internal to documentary making without a sound 
knowledge of the subject.
Beabout (2012: 415) makes a similar point about coaching. He 
argues that:
If someone is very good as a basketball coach, it does not follow that the 
same person would be very good as the coach of a golf squad or a 
swimming team. Excellence as a coach is intimately  tied to the coach's 
familiarity with the particular sport.
Beabout makes a good point here, but it is not clear that it supports his 
argument for management as a domain-relative practice because un-
like coaches, managers need not be familiar with the domain in 
question. Basketball is a practice with identifiable internal goods, 
which is why basketball coaches do not and cannot typically move 
into golf or swimming coaching. To understand the goods internal to a 
practice requires at least some experience, and to become sufficiently 
adept to coach others properly requires rather a lot. Managers, on the 
other hand, can more easily move from one industry to another, and 
management consultants can be drafted in by any company, regardless 
of whether or not that particular institution houses a practice. Manage-
ment, therefore, seems to require neither a familiarity with the nature 
of the business they are working in nor for that business to be 
practice-based. This is not to say that such familiarity will not 
sometimes be advantageous,2  nor that exceptionally charismatic and 
motivating sports coaches cannot move into different sports, nor that 
some people are simply multi-talented and can master a variety of 
practices, but it tells against Beabout’s account that managers chang-
ing from one industry to another occurs as frequently as it does. Top 
swimming coaches almost never become top basketball coaches. The 
internal goods, and the time and devotion required to achieve them, 
are just too different for such transitions to be easily achievable. 
Beabout’s argument is thus susceptible to the general objection that 
management is not domain-relative.
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2  Beabout  gives the example of an electric company manager who was once a lineman, 
and whose practical experience allowed him to solve problems that had stumped other 
managers. Furthermore, within practices managers might require familiarity with the 
practice to excel as managers, but in such cases it is the partial engagement  with the 
practice that is key.
Beabout claims that just as we can judge basketball coaches by 
either success (in terms of victories, and therefore in terms of external 
goods) or excellence (according to the standards internal to coaching), 
a manager can be judged according to measurable outcomes or by 
standards of excellence. Beabout (2012: 418) describes managerial 
work as involving “budgeting, scheduling, hiring, firing, allocating, 
implementing, monitoring, correcting . . . greeting, listening, planning, 
identifying, solving, communicating, motivating, delegating, 
mentoring, celebrating.” Someone who possesses the skills needed to 
do all of those things well has a good chance of being a good 
manager, that is, of achieving Beabout’s examples of goods internal to 
management, “administering and leading” (2012: 418), excellently, 
regardless of the domain. The tactical and technical insights required 
by an excellent swimming coach will be of almost no use to that 
coach if he or she attempted to break into the world of basketball 
coaching. Perhaps the ability to motivate players is a rhetorical skill 
common to both swimming and basketball coaching, but even then, 
the excellent swimming coach who is also an excellent orator but who 
knows nothing of basketball is unlikely to be able to excellently 
motivate basketball players, for whom the coach’s ignorance of their 
sport will be obvious. An inspirational power company executive 
might be hired by any number of companies in any number of indus-
tries, but is unlikely to become the head coach of a sports team. By 
contrast, it is not uncommon for sports coaches to be asked to give 
talks to business leaders and business students. The distinction 
between practices and non-practices helps to explain this asymmetry.
iii) MacIntyre’s Politics
Beabout (2012: 419) claims that MacIntyre “has done little to develop 
an account of practical wisdom as a virtue helpful for those . . . 
charged with managing institutions that house social practices,” and 
goes on to elaborate his own account of what managerial excellence 
involves. The crucial feature of management, according to Beabout 
(2012: 427), is that it requires practical wisdom:
In order to become excellent at managing, it  is necessary to develop a set 
of character traits; chief among these is the virtue of practical wisdom. 
Practical wisdom is the habit of mind whereby one is excellent in each 
case at finding the available means to accomplish a worthy end.
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However practical wisdom is a virtue that is required to act ex-
cellently in any context. It will no doubt be required by virtuous 
managers as it is required by all virtuous people. Furthermore, the 
practical wisdom required by Beabout’s account of management is 
rather like the virtues MacIntyre regards as being essential to politics. 
Beabout says MacIntyre (2007: 194) claims that institutions have “all 
the characteristics of a practice,” but what MacIntyre (2007: 194) 
actually says is that “the making and sustaining of forms of human 
community – and therefore of institutions – itself has all the char-
acteristics of a practice.” This point makes sense only if we first 
understand the contrast MacIntyre draws between institutions and 
practices. Institutions, so MacIntyre argues, are primarily concerned 
with external goods (e.g., money, power, and prestige), whereas the 
defining characteristic of practices is their internal goods. Therefore, 
MacIntyre’s point is that sustaining institutions which allow humans 
to cultivate the virtues and to achieve their good is a practice, and so 
managers who sustain these kinds of institutions will be engaged in a 
practice. Sustaining institutions in and of itself cannot be a practice 
because institutions can be oppressive or merely acquisitive. The 
name MacIntyre (2007: 195) gives to the practice of institutionally 
sustaining communities is ‘politics’, which has been a central theme 
in MacIntyre’s work. So, contrary to Beabout’s assertion, MacIntyre 
has devoted much of his life’s work to providing an ethical framework 
which might prove ‘helpful’ to those who aim to sustain practice-
based forms of human community.
In conclusion, while Beabout makes a laudable attempt to avoid 
the Scylla of MacIntyre’s outright rejection of management and the 
Charybdis of an excessively broad conception of practices, it is not 
clear that he has provided a fully convincing account. I suggest that a 
more political understanding of good management may be a more 
promising avenue.
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